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Standard microeconomics deals with the egoistic subject homo oeconomicus, who
achieves his own welfare. In the economic behaviour of some subjects there is also a concern
in the welfare of others.
Many people are - to some extent - ready to give up their own benefit (for example
financial) in favour of their fellows. We refer here to the belonging to a community, when the
individual is (or feels to be) a part of this community, for example belonging to family, firm,
country or just the community of the fair people. Slightly more general concept is the concept
of altruism as an unselfish foregoing of personal profit in favour of the other person (or
persons), for example the financial donation.
Altruism and belonging to the community is the natural part of human ethics. Adam
Smith, a classicist of economics, is astonished about the human emphasise on the ethical part
of human behaviour even in the economic sense which is not only determined by personal
benefit
1. Important issues (even though not dominant in last time) are demonstrations,
principles and incentives of human mutuality
2.
Altruism motivated by expected compensation is being denoted as “soft”. If the
donator does not expect any compensation, we speak about the “hard” altruism
3. Hard altruist
is abstractedly of the norms of individual social groups actuated to do “good” and he/she feels
happy if he can offer the donation. Characteristic of hard altruist is the non-calculating feeling
of satisfaction from welfare of the other persons. The hard altruist donates without
expectation of reciprocity.
Altruistic behaviour can be also viewed as a part of a viable community, higher level
of the feel of belonging is usually revealed by a higher donation.
4 This increases ceteris
paribus chance for survival of this community in competition with the other communities.
                                                
1 His Theory of Moral Sentiments was published in 1759.
2 The other important and now already classical reflection to the incentives of human to offer the donation is
Mauses essay about donation (Mauss, M. [1966])
3 The  distinction between "soft" and "hard" altruism was done by the founder of sociobiology E.O. Wilson
(1978).
4 Also not necessarily. Altruist could by non rational self-sacrifice in some case threaten the whole community.
For example extreme self-sacrifice of one member of family could threaten his survival and destroy the family
by this. For more details see Hlaváček J. et all [1999], paragraph 10.4Altruism and even the “hard” altruism could be perceived within economic paradigm
of homo oeconomicus if we perceive it as a special case of belonging to the community
5. If
the altruist feels mutuality with the other subjects and if he perceives them as part of himself (
“Me”), the donation of financial support could be explained by (basically neo-classical) utility
maximisation. If  the objective of the subject is minimisation of the threat of downfall than
this subject who is a symphatisant or a member of community embodies aversion not only to
situations with high level of economic threat to his person, but also to situations with high
economic threat to other members of the community.
Let's  suppose, that  the decision criterion of the donator is his subjective probability of
his (economic) survival including survival of  “his” community. He is averse to situations
threatening survival of members of that community or survival of the community as a whole.
He compares that threats with the threat of his own survival.
In the text ahead  we will give several examples of the models, in which the donator
offers a financial subsidy in order to increase probability of recipient's survival. He takes into
account the danger of his own self destruction as a result of too high financial expenses for
subsidies.
 2. Probability of (economical) survival proportional to the relative
reserve: Pareto probability distribution
Let us suppose that the survival of two subjects, the donator and the recipient of
donation, depends only on their income. In addition let us suppose that the probability of
survival (felt by the donator) of each subject is proportional to the ratio of his reserve
(measured according to the zone of unavoidable downfall) to his income.
Then the distribution function is given by:
F(x)=(x-b)/x for  x≥b
F(x)= 0 for  x<b
and the probability density by:
f(x)=b/x
2 for  x≥b
f(x)= 0 for  x<b
                                                
5 See Etzioni, A. [1999]. ”Me“ in his approach contains ”We”, which is part of every individual. Social and
ethical dimension of human preferences according to Etzioni necessarily strengthens stability and usually also
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Fig. 1 : Distribution of the probability according to the relative reserve: Pareto
distribution of first degree with the boundary of zone of unavoidable downfall for b = 1:
probability density f(x),  distribution  function F(x).
This distribution function refers to the Pareto distribution of the first degree
6. The
Pareto distribution embodies zero probability for income on the boundary of unavoidable
downfall and probability converging to one with increasing the income to infinity. This is true
for both subjects.
Let us suppose for simplicity only two subjects in the first two models: recipient of
donation (we will denote his income by d) and the donator (with starting income A0, we  will
denote his income after donation by a). If we suppose, that the donation is the only income of
recipient, his income d is also the level of offered donation.
We interpret the probability of survival as an subjective felt idea about ability to
survive. We will suppose that the starting income of the donator A0 enables survival of both
subjects with non-zero probability (subjectively felt by the donator), so that it will hold:
A0>D+A
                                                
6 Pareto distribution is used for example to analyse incomes of consumers. Pareto distribution of the second
degree was used in Hlaváček J., Hlaváček M. (2004). General Pareto distribution of degree a and with boundary
b has an distribution function
F(x)=1-(b/x)
a for  x≥b,
F(x)=0       for   x<b,
and  function of probability density
f(x)=(a/b).(b/x)
a+1 for  x≥b
f(x)=0       for  x<b .D is a boundary of zone of unavoidable downfall of recipient of donation, A is the
boundary of unavoidable downfall of the donator (under these levels subjects lose the ability
to survive in economic sense).
By application of Pareto distribution of the first degree for both considered
probabilities we will get the following:
p1(d)  = 0                 for d<D
= (d - D) / d   for d≥ D
p2(a)  = 0                for a<A
    = (a - A) / a   for a ≥ A
where  a,  A  is income and boundary of zone of unavoidable downfall of the donator
and  d , D is income and boundary of zone of unavoidable downfall of recipient of the
donation.
The appropriate  non-symmetric distribution functions are:
η(d) =  0  for  d < D
                = D/d
2 
          for d  ≥ D
η(a)  = 0      for a<  A
                   = A/a
2 for a  ≥ A.
Let us also suppose that the donator is convinced that both subjects have non-zero
probability of survival, so that d >D ∧ a >A.
For probability of survival of both subjects we suppose that it is zero for income on
boundary of unavoidable downfall and that it converges to one with increasing the income to
infinity. This is again true for both subjects.
3. Model of maximisation of probability of simultaneous survival of both
subjects (the donator and the donation recipient)
The donator here altruistically evaluates his own threat of downfall equally  as the
threat of downfall of donation recipient. He also supposes independence of both individual
threats. Let us suppose that the only threat to both subjects is the  threat by low level of
financial assets.
The criterion of the donator is in this case the function:
p(d,a) = p1(d). p2(a) = (D.A - d.A - a.D + d.a) / (d.a)The donator thus solves optimisation problem:
      max     p(d ,a)
              d+a≤ A0
The solution of this optimisation problem could be modified with help of the Lagrange
function to this problem:
max L(d ,a,λ) = max [p(d,a) + λ(A0 -d –a)]
By differentiation of function L with respect to d,a,λwe get fist order conditions for
optimum:
d.A .(d - D)= a.D (a  -A)
d + a= A0
If the threat of downfall is the same for both subjects (D=A), the solution is
d = a= A0/ 2 (uniform division of income)
7 .
If it holds that D > A, the solution is in favour of more threatened recipient of donation
(d>a), so it leads to the “hard” altruistic favouring the recipient
 of donation
8. At the same time
the rate of favouring of more threatened donated subject falls with growing A0 (for income of
the donator equal to A0=D+A it is  d/a= D/A for income A0 converging to infinity it goes to
d/a= A D/  , so the higher starting income of the donator leads to more uniform division ).
However, if A0<A+D , when the starting income of the donator is so low, that it excludes the
survival of both subjects at the same time, then the problem does not have solution and the
decision has to be made according to some different criterion. Similar outcomes hold in case
when the more threatened subject is the donator. Dependence of level of donation on starting
level of income of the donator is shown for both cases in figures 2 and 3:
                                                
7 For D=A and d+a=A0 we could rewrite first optimality condition as (d-a).(A0-A)=0. From A0>D+A it is obvious
that A0>A so A0-A>0. The only solution is thus d=a=A0/2.
8 Optimum must hold that marginal transfer of resources from first subject to the second increases probability of
its downfall in the same rate, as it decreases probability of downfall of the second subject. In other words, partial
derivations of probabilities of downfall of both subject with respect to income must be the same. From here it is
possible to derive the optimal rate in which the donator splits up his income M0. For example for Pareto























Figure. 2: Level of donation in dependence on starting level of income of
the donator in model of maximisation of probability of simultaneous






Figure 3: Level of donation in dependence on starting level of income of
the donator in model of maximisation of probability of simultaneous
survival of both subjects in case of D<A
The behaviour of the donator is thus given not only by his altruistic criterion, but also
on the situation of individual subjects (in our case in relation of their resistance or threat of
downfall). Hard economic behaviour could be result of decision making of the “hard”
altruistic donator.
4. Model of minimisation of probability of simultaneous downfall of both
subjects
The donator is again the “hard” altruist in this model, also he has a different decision
criterion, than the hard altruist in the preceding model. In this model the donator maximises
probability of survival of at least one member of the community. This alternative of “hard”altruist is concerned only about survival of one of two subjects, but he does not care whether
the surviving subject would be him or his subsidy recipient.
Probability of survival of at least one subject could be expressed as:
p = p(d, a) = p1 + p2  –  p1.p2 = (d-D)/d + (a-A)/a - (d-D)/d . (a-A)/a
The first summand reflects probability of survival of first subject and downfall of the
second, second summand reflects probability of survival of the second subject and downfall
of the first and the third reflects probability of survival of both at one time.
We again suppose that initial income of the donator does not rule out simultaneous
survival of both subjects (the donator and the recipient of donation), thus:
A0 > D + A
Again we could model the behaviour of the donator by:
    max    p(d ,a)
                     d+a≤ A0
which could be again modified:
               max  L(d ,a ,λ) = max [(p(d,a) + λ.(A0 - d - a)]
               d+a≤ A0                          d+a≤ A0
which gives first order conditions:
d = a  ∧  d + a= A0
The optimal distribution of income is:
d = a = A0/2.
If the starting income A0 of the donator disables simultaneous survival of both
subjects, the optimal strategy for the donator changes significantly: unlike the identical
support of both he moves all the resources to a more resistant member of the community. If
the donator is the more resistant, i.e. if it holds that D>A, the  donation falls to zero and the
recipient of donation is in this case (similarly as in first model) sacrificed even by the altruist
of the “hard” type. If the recipient is more resistant subject (D<A), the donator chooses self
destruction, which enables survival of the subsidy recipient.
Dependence of the optimal level of donation on the starting income of the donator A0
for both mentioned cases is graphed in following figures 4 and 5:A0
d d=A0
d=A0/2
AD + A D
Figure 4: Level of donation  depending on the  level of starting income of the donator
A0 in the model of minimising the threat of simultaneous downfall of both subjects, in




DD + A A
Figure 5:  Level of donation  depending on the  level of starting income of the donator
A0 in the model of minimising the threat of simultaneous downfall of both subjects, in
the case where the more threatened is the donator.
In this model the rational altruist could be forced to behave either as a "homo
oeconomicus" or as an altruist of the hard type. It depends on parameters of the model.
5. Model of minimisation of threat of downfall of bigger part of the
community
In this model of altruistic behaviour of the donator we will suppose his criterion as
maximisation of probability of survival of the bigger part of the community. We will suppose
that the community has three members (one donator and two recipients of donation), whichwould dissolve in case of downfall of two members of this community. This model will
enable us to describe the type of the strategy, which is called “gambit” in chess: one of
members of the community could be sacrificed in favour of survival of the other two
members.
Let us suppose different level of individual threat of downfall of three subjects, while
the most resistant is the donator (level of threat A), recipient i downfalls if he has income
equal or lower than Di. We will number the recipients of donation so that
A <D1 < D2,
thus the second recipient of donation is most threatened by downfall from all three
subjects.
We will again suppose that the initial income enables survival of at least two most
resistant members of the community with non-zero probability:
A0 > A+D1
Probability of survival of the community (according to assumptions, the probability of
simultaneous survival of at least two members of the community) could be expressed by
following way
9:
p = p(d1, d2, d3) = p1 . p2 (1-p3) + p1 . p3 (1-p2) + p2 . p3 (1-p1) +
        + p1. p2.p3 = p1 . p2 (1-p3) + p1 . p3 (1-p2) + p2 . p3
Problem of the donator could be again modelled by:
     max     p(a, d1, d2)
               a+d1+d2≤ A0
We could take into account two possible strategies: either try to equalise individual
probabilities of survival of all three members of the community (Strategy A), or sacrifice the
weakest member of the community  and equalise the probability of survival of two stronger
members (Strategy B). Any different strategy would make possible to transfer resources from
a less threatened to a more threatened member of the community and thus increasing the
maximised criterion of the donator.
                                                
9 We again suppose, that the downfall of each member does not depend directly on downfall of the other. The
dependence is given only by survival of the whole community. For example, this model would not work in case
of family with three members (father, mother, child) when the mother dies of sorrow in case of death of the
child.Strategy A (effort for survival of all three members)
To make the survival of all three members of the community at one time possible it
must hold that the initial income of the donator has to be higher than the sum of boundaries of
the zone of the unavoidable downfall of all three subjects:
A0 > A+D1+D2
The conditions for optimal choice of the donator ensures that the individual
probabilities of the survival would be equal for all three subjects (otherwise it would be
possible to increase the donator’s objective function by transfer of resources). Equality of
probabilities of survival for all three members of the community (with use of whole income
A0, which is the condition fulfilled in optimum automatically for this criterion) will hold for
following division of total income A0:
a = A0 . A/(A+D1+D2)
di = A0 . Di/(A+D1+D2)   for   i = 1,2
Probability of survival of at least two members of the community could thus expressed
as:
pA =  (a - A).(d1 - D1) / (a.d1)+
 (a - A).(d2 - D2) / (a.d2)+
 (d1 - D1) .(d2 - D2) / (d2.d1)
Because in this case it holds that p1=p2=p3=p we could calculate probability of









1 2 3 p p − , where  p1 =(a-A)/a= 1 – (A+D1+D2)/A0
Strategy B (effort for survival of two strongest members of the community)
Equalisation of probabilities of survival of two strongest members of the community
(again with use of whole income A0, which condition is fulfilled automatically in optimum)
leads to following division of income:
a = A0 . A/(A+D1)
d1= A0 . D1/(A+D1)
d2 = 0
Because in this case it holds that p1 = p2 and p3=0, we could calculate the probability
of survival of the community as:
pB = (a - A)(d1-D1)/(a.d1) = [1- (A+D1)/A0]
2
where we use expressions for  a and d1 in the second step.Let us compare both strategies. Strategy A increases number of favourable cases of
survival, however at the cost of lower allowance to every subject and thus at the cost of the
higher risk of individual downfall. On the contrary, the strategy B limits the favourable cases
only to one (survival of the two strongest members), but their individual probabilities of the
survival are now higher (they have higher income thanks to the sacrifice of the weakest
member).
Comparison of  the probabilities of survival of at least two members of the community
















Figure 6:  Comparison of the strategies A,B - the case of the same threat of all
subjects A = D1 = D2. The donator switches his strategy when  A0= H.
On the other hand, if A0> H, the optimal strategy is to sustain all three members. If one
of recipients has lower resistance then the other agents, H is higher
10.
The allocation of the resources ensures that the probability of survival is same for all
three members of the community so the optimal allocation is:
a = A.A0 /(A+D1+D2)
d1=D1.A0 /(A+D1+D2)
d2=D2.A0 /(A+D1+D2)
                                                
10 H could be calculated algebraically if we let pA=pB , which gives H as an expression dependent on A0, A, D1
and D2. However the calculation is quite complicated (cubic equation) and even the result is not particularly
insightful.This means, that in a case when the optimal strategy A is chosen, the most threatened
member of the community receives the greatest part from total income of the community,
while the smallest part of income is obtained by the strongest (safest) member.
Solution of this optimisation problem thus depends on the level of disposal income of
the whole community A0. For high A0/A>H it is optimal to favour the third (most threatened)
member of the community. For low A0/A<H it is optimal to sacrifice the initially favoured
member and divide the whole income between the first two members, favouring the second
member over the first one, to equalise their individual probabilities for survival. This is
illustrated in figure 6:
income of subject
A0 D2 A+D1 A/H
donator
More resistant recipient of donation
Less resistant recipient of donation
Figure 6: Distribution of incomes if individual members
If the both recipients have the same resistance (but less resistant than the donator), the
donator is indifferent whom of them sacrifice in case of fall of income A0 under H. The
donator would accept draw between both recipient on the donation. If the donator is the least
resistant member of the community (i.e. if A<min (D1,D2)), the optimal solution (in case when
A0<A) for him is self destruction.
Our “hard” altruistic donator is totally identified with the community as a hole. He
either loses  impulse of self-preservation and be ready to self-destruct or decides which
member of the community will be sacrificed. The altruist can be cruel.6. The model of maximal extent of survival
In this model, the criterion of the altruistic donator is the maximisation of the expected
value of the number of community members who will survive.
Again, let us suppose the community consisting of three members with their
boundaries of unavoidable individual downfall A, D1, D2, while the community is threatened
by the low number of surviving members. The altruistic donator is fully identified with the
goal of the community. The sum of the initial incomes of all members of the community again
does not rule out the survival of all three members of the community at one time:
A0>A+D1+D2
We will suppose the greater resistance of the donator and the same resistance of both
recipients of the donation:
A<D1=D2
We will again suppose Pareto distribution of the first degree, when the probability of
survival of the individual converges to one if its income growth to infinity and equals zero if
income is below the boundary of the zone of the unavoidable downfall. Probabilities of




The criteria (maximised) function is in case of maximisation of the expected value of
the number of the members of the community:
p(a , d1, d2) = p1(a)+p2(d1)+p3(d2)
Decision making of the donator could be thus described by:
max   p(a , d1, d2)
           a+d1+d2≤ A0
This problem could be modified with help of Lagrange function:







a + d1 + d2  = A0
From this we could figure out the optimal division of the resources, or by other words the
optimal strategy of the donator:



























If the criterion of the donator is the maximisation of the expected value of the number
of surviving members, the donator allocates the resources in favour of  the more threatened
members of the community, however the solution leads to the lower level of differentiation
than in preceding models:
a : d1 :d2 =  2 1 : : D D A .
Similarly to the preceding models the fall of the income leads to discontinuous change
of an allocation,  while in this point of discontinuity the donator sacrifies the least resistant of
the community and divides the income between him and more resistant recipient of the
donation.
*          *          *
We have shown that the altruism of  donators could have many forms. The particular
form of his criterion influences significantly his decision about allocation of his resources
between recipients of the donation. Moreover, even under one criterion we could mention
sudden change in strategy of the rational donator: This donator, even he is a “hard” altruist
and favours the interests of the community over his own  individual interests, could be forced
by situation to “gambit”, so to the sacrifice of one subject in favour of the whole community.Preference of the interests of the community over interests of the individuals (including
interests of the donator by himself) could lead the donator to the liquidation of the (in other
situation preferred) least resistant members of the community. Interesting is also the
discontinuity in the behaviour of the donator: even small change of disposal income leads to
strong change of the allocation, including the liquidation of the preferred subject.
From the point of view of this interpretation we could generalise the results of our
analysis to the behaviour of the donator- state. This donator decides about existence of the
particular projects and the comprehension of the patterns in its donation policy fall in rank of
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